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Abstract 
The complaints about insufficient private investment are frequent in Poland. Equally often we do hear the criticism of 
the monetary policy pointing to excessively high interest rates. This paper estimates the speed of upward adjustment of 
loan rates relative to downward adjustment, accounting for different market segments and products. The empirical 
results show that for the investment credit upward adjustment is fast, but downward adjustment essentially does not 
occur. Consumer credit products demonstrate positive values for the speed of both adjustments although still upward 
changes occur faster than downwards ones. These findings suggest that banks may tend to discriminate entrepreneurs 
against other types of borrowers. This type of strategy can be only sustainable under insufficient competition or with 
the behavioral parallelism among the banks.  
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Introduction1 
As demonstrated by Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and 
Levine (2003) in a cross-section survey of countries, 
concentration is positively and significantly linked 
with the net interest margins, even controlling for 
bank specific and country specific factors. However, 
high degree of concentration is not necessarily 
equivalent to lower levels of competition. Some 
researchers suggest that concentration results from 
more efficient and faster growing banks taking over 
the less efficient and less rapidly expanding ones. 
Thus, the alternative hypothesis states that markets 
become more concentrated precisely due to higher 
competition accompanied by constantly improving 
efficiency (Berger and Hannan, 1989). In this case, 
however, collusion and behavioral parallelism are 
neglected as potential underpinnings. 
Tracing the concentration-retail interest rates nexus, 
Corvosier and Gropp (2001) analyzed a sample of 
10 EU countries for which detailed data about the 
credit and deposit were offered as well as market 
shares were available. They found that higher con-
centration results in collusion – the more concen-
trated the banking market is, the higher the margins 
on both deposits and credits are. However, in case 
of savings and long-term deposits the results were 
opposite, which may be justified by the differences 
in the switching costs as well as the availability of 
information. Nevertheless, some form of boosting 
the price of banking products following from con-
centration seems robust across countries and across 
time in Western Europe. 
In this paper we attempt to address the case of Po-
land with the following motivation. On one hand, 
one clearly observes private investment relatively 
low by European and OECD standards – this is 
rather unexpected in a relatively fast developing 
transition economy. On the other hand, credit un-
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availability is always among top concerns of the 
entrepreneurs, while consumer lending including 
mortgage is booming. With a history of non-
performing investment loans in the beginning of 
transformation, one could justify this by poor qual-
ity of entrepreneurial debtors. However, currently 
the quality of loans does not fall short of the stan-
dard EU values. At the same time, qualitative re-
search suggests that some forms of credit rationing 
may be observed among banks in Poland, especially 
vis-a-vis small and medium sized enterprises, SMEs 
(Akiba and Lisowska, 2006). The main channels 
were identified as restraining from developing 
evaluation techniques suitable for SMEs and requir-
ing high or inadequate collateral.  
Unfortunately, replicating the studies by Corvoisier 
and Gropp (2001) or Demirguc-Kunt, Leaven and 
Levine (2003) is not possible, as the availability of 
Polish data in this respect is incomparably poorer. 
This paper resorts to a different approach. We ana-
lyze whether the responses of banks to changes in 
the cost of capital are symmetric. We find that in the 
short run banks essentially do not respond in in-
vestment loans rates to decreases in interest rates. 
Moreover, this process has no ergodic properties (no 
mean reversion). When the behavior of investment 
and consumer loan rates is compared, the latter 
process seems to exhibit mean reversion patterns 
within six to seven months after an initial shock, 
while the asymmetry is significantly less intense 
than in the case of loans to the entrepreneurs. While 
suggesting discrimination, these results may be ex-
plained on the grounds of behavioral parallelism or 
insufficient competitive pressure1.2In the second 
                                                 
1 In this paper, following Buccirossi (2006) collusion (a cooperation 
agreement) is distinguished from parallel behavior. In a model of price 
competition with differentiated products in which demand and costs vary 
over time Buccirossi demonstrates that in some cases perfect parallel 
pricing is compatible only with a competitive equilibrium, and therefore 
provides some evidence that firms did not collude. In addition, the 
competitive equilibrium is characterized by a higher market share stability 
than a collusive equilibrium in this framework. 
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approach the cointegrating relation between col-
lected deposits and assigned credit is sought in at-
tempt to verify whether shortage of competition can 
be held responsible for the discriminatory practices. 
The findings suggest that little or no links can be 
found between deposits and credits on both sectoral 
and bank levels. 
The paper is organized as follows. Next section 
discusses the origins and subsequent developments 
in the Polish banking sector. We further develop a 
model suitable for analyzing the symmetry of the 
response to a shock and estimate long-run and short-
run equilibria of the investment credit interest rate 
stochastic processes (ECM) trying to identify their 
determinants. We also proceed with a second model 
employed in this paper, linking deposit and credit 
policies on the basis of implicit market structures. 
The last section concludes the paper. 
1. Polish banking system 
The reform of the banking system was one of the 
most significant steps in originating the transition 
from centrally planned to market economy. Prior to 
1989, banking system was only a part of the com-
mand system where interest rates were set adminis-
tratively and so there were the directions and the 
policies with reference to credit and deposit activi-
ties. Except for the National Bank of Poland (which 
combined some of the central bank and commercial 
bank characteristics) four specialized banks not 
competing with each other operated in the banking 
system1. As of 1989, National Bank of Poland 
played the role of central bank, while all its over 
400 divisions and commercial operations were taken 
over by 9 newly created banks. In addition, the 
regulations concerning opening new banks were 
relaxed in order to allow entry2. In 2001 there were 
as many as 75 commercial banks operating in Po-
land, out of which one was state-owned and two had 
state in the role of majority owner. Among ten larg-
est banks in Central and Eastern Europe, five were 
based in Poland, two of which hold the first and 
second positions in the ranking3. 
Available data suggest that over the last decade 
concentration has increased significantly. In 1993, 
for over a half of the bank population the biggest 
holding was smaller than 50% (on average it 
amounted to 28%). Banks with only one shareholder 
constituted approximately 1/3 of the population. Six 
years later banks managed through a minority hold-
ing constituted only 18% of the population, with 
average holding increasing to 45% of shares. The 
majority of the banks (over 56%) have a majority 
owner (controlling more than 75% of shares). 
Within the same period the number of banks has 
dropped by 12%4. 
This progressive concentration may be inferred from 
both concentration indices and interest spreads by 
commercial banks. First, with the eventual relaxing 
of monetary policy, spreads on investment credits 
(as measured by the differential between credit and 
deposit rates of the same duration) have increased 
drastically. This is depicted in Figure 1. An average 
credit rate was glued to the central bank discount 
rate until January 2001, while subsequently the 
credit and simultaneously deposit spreads grew (up-
per left graph). Since second half of year 2001 credit 
rate has remained on a disproportionately high level. 
Table 1. Number of commercial banks1234 
Type of bank 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Majority state 
ownership 29 29 27 24 15 13 7 7 7 5 3 2 1 
Majority 
private 
ownership 
58 53 54 57 68 70 70 67 65 63 55 47 37 
Polish owner-
ship 48 42 36 32 39 31 20 17 13 9 6 6 5 
Foreign 
ownership 10 11 18 25 29 31 29 47 48 41 38 35 31 
Note: without banks undergoing the bankruptcy procedures or liquidation. 
Data source: Central Bank of Poland (NBP). 
                                                 
1 One bank served international commercial operations, the second one specialized in private international operations, the third one collected private 
deposits and the last one practically conducted no operations between 1945 and 1989. In addition, in 1987 National Bank of Poland, Ministry of 
International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance, two of the already existing banks and foreign trade agencies originated a fifth bank to provide 
mutually needed services. All these banks continued operations as universal banks following the transition, enjoying the first mover advantage. In 
addition, there were 1663 small mutual banks, serving the needs of local farmers and/or artisans. 
2 Banks can operate as state-owned, mutual or private institutions, once necessary capital and facilities are gathered – the license was initially 
awarded by the President of the central bank and subsequently this prerogative was allocated to the Superintendence of the Banking System. 
3 Measured by both the size of deposits acquired and the amount of loans granted. See: KBC 2003 report to the stockholders. 
4 Cfr. Kopczewski, Pawlowska, Rogowski (2000). 
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Data source: NBP and ECB. 
Fig. 1. Developments in the Polish banking sector 
 
Data source: NBP. 
Fig. 2. Creditors and lenders in the Polish banking sector 
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Although performing any verifications of eco-
nomic causality would be methodologically 
doubtful given the data limitations, higher con-
centration and higher spreads undoubtedly coexist 
in time suggesting at the very least a decreasing 
degree of competition in the Polish banking sec-
tor. Similar conclusion can be made basing on the 
relation between spread and effective economy 
interest rates, i.e. considering obligatory reserve 
rates and systemic risk (upper right graph). 
Spreads in Poland are related to WIBOR (Warsaw 
Interbank Offering Rate) corrected for reserve 
ratio. As of 2001 a definite change in trend is 
visible. Although this is the moment of an eco-
nomic slowdown in Polish economy, similar out-
looks characterized Euro Zone economies. Thus, 
even though systemic risk might have risen in this 
period due to the slowing down of the economy, 
one seems to find little justification for this range 
of change. This measure evidently underestimates 
the systemic risk in Polish economy, nonetheless, 
it seems a fair indication of changes thereof 
(lower left graph). Polish spreads show definitely 
higher variation than in the Euro Zone, but also 
pertain to astonishingly high levels, remaining in 
a fairly stable band of 4-6 percentage points for 
the past five years1. 
Finally, as depicted by the graph in the lower right 
panel, consumer credit has consistently become 
more important use of deposits allocation. Over the 
past seven years, the share of consumer credit has 
risen from 15% to over 35%, while no changes can 
be observed in allocations to small and medium 
enterprises. Large enterprises, among which state-
owned are, becoming less important due to the pro-
gress of privatization, maintained a regular increase 
of approximately 5 percentage points over this pe-
riod. Interestingly, as depicted in Figure 2 household 
credits growth rate by far exceeds deposits growth 
rate. Consequently, households’ deposits and credit 
levels are currently becoming increasingly alike. At 
the same time, despite vivid economic growth, entre-
preneurs have become net lenders. 
Small and medium enterprises in Poland (among 
which individual enterprises outnumber all other 
types, providing employment to nearly 25% of 
working age population) are at the core of Polish 
economic recovery after 1989. The rapid growth of 
SMEs was initially financed from private uninstitu-
tionalized savings and remittances. This trend has 
                                                 
1 Because these patterns hold, in the following analysis we assume that 
even though the cost of credit to bank cannot be measured externally, 
directions of changes may be proxied by some economic indicators 
external to the bank itself (e.g., central bank's interest rates, 
interbanking rates or sector-wide deposit rates). 
continued despite the gradual development of the 
banking sector. However, some researchers point to 
the fact that currently most of SMEs are financially 
constrained due to purposeful credit policy choices 
by most of the banks. Following the survey among 
11 biggest Polish banks in early 20052 by Akiba and 
Lisowska (2006) the channels of this institutional 
credit rationing are identified to include restraining 
from developing evaluation techniques suitable for 
SMEs3 or requiring high or inadequate collateral. 
Surveys demonstrate that purposefully required 
collateral is set in order to discourage SMEs. In 
internal guidelines banks perceive a bill of exchange 
as only quasi-guarantee. Similarly, submission to 
bank enforcement title, although regularly stipulated 
by credit contracts, is not highly priced by the 
banks. What the banks value is the mortgage on 
industrial property (not residential, while SMEs 
rarely possess their own real estate or it is hardly 
separable from the property of the firm owner), fol-
lowed by registered pledge on machinery (with the 
assignment of rights from the insurance contract), 
assignment of receivables and pledge on stock. Fi-
nally, they typically force transfer of ownership (to 
be withheld and/or used several times). 
Table 2. Panzar and Rosse estimates of market 
structure competitiveness 
Study Commercial 
banks 
Retail 
banks 
Corporate 
banks 
Total 
Pawlowska (2006): 
Poland 1997-1999 0.78 0.72 0.61 0.70 
Poland 1999-2003 0.49 0.64 0.45 0.51 
Hungary 1997-2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.65 
Czech Republic 1997-
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.58 
Gelos and Roldos 
(2002): 1994 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.54 
Claessens and Laeven 
(2003): 1994-2001 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.77 
Notes: hypotheses of perfect competition (H = 1) and monopoly 
(H = 0) are rejected at 0.1% confidence levels. The difference 
between 1997-1999 and 1999-2003 estimates is statistically 
significant at 0.01% level. Gelos and Roldos (2002) and Claes-
sens and Laeven (2003) base on BANKSCOPE data. Paw-
lowska (2006) bases on the whole of the Polish banking sector. 
Data for Hungary and Czech Republic are basing on 
BANKSCOPE data. 
Source: Pawlowska (2006), Gelos and Roldos (2002), Claessens 
and Laeven (2003). 
                                                 
2 Combined market shares of these 11 banks exceed 70% both in credit 
and in deposit markets. 
3 In Poland, SMEs enjoy less demanding accounting standards under tax 
regulations (namely, they are entitled to a lump sum tax and/or allowed 
to maintain inflow/outflow ledgers instead of complete accounting 
documentation). Consequently, contemporary computerized evaluation 
methods cannot be applied to a majority of SMEs. In addition, these 
advantages are essentially at the expense of a credit tax shield. 
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Such discriminating policies are only sustainable 
if other banks fall short of the competitive pres-
sure. In the analysis based on Panzar and Rosse 
(1987) methodology, Pawlowska (2006) demon-
strated that perfect competition hypothesis is 
unanimously rejected for Polish banking sector as 
a whole as well as for each of the separate groups 
of banks. These findings are consistent with Gelos 
and Roldos (2002) as well as Claessens and 
Laeven (2003), but extend the bank sample be-
yond BankScope as well as account for bank spe-
cialization. 
The extent of competitive pressure within Polish 
banking sector is becoming less intense over time, 
while monopolistic competition seems to be char-
acteristic for CEECs as a whole. Nonetheless, 
collusion hypothesis seems rather unlikely. First 
of all, following Bikker (2004) and Hempell 
(2002) this conclusion can be extended to Europe 
at large, while Panzar and Rosse estimates for EU 
countries all fall into the range of 0.55 for Spain 
to 0.89 for Belgium. As suggested by empirical 
analyses, it is rather the hypothesis of behavioral 
parallelism that finds support in data. Banks tend 
to replicate the same pattern not because an 
agreement has been made between them, but be-
cause such behavior guarantees the highest pay-
offs subject to effort minimization criterion 
(Akibe and Lisowska, 2006). 
2. Asymmetry of the response to a shock 
Some analysts claim that increasing the credit 
rates immediately after the central bank decision 
to raise the interest rates constitutes already a 
proof for uncompetitive market structure. How-
ever, prices in competitive markets should reflect 
the opportunity cost of the inputs and not the ac-
counting cost of acquiring it, which makes this 
argument easy to dismiss. On the other hand, an 
asymmetry in the response time (immediate in the 
case of increases and delayed in the case of de-
creases) provides a strong proof for the claim of 
insufficient competition. 
To estimate the rate at which prices adjust to 
changes in the underlying fundamentals, we assume 
a simple linear long-run relationship between central 
bank interest rates and the cost of credit, 
CR 10 φφ += , where R and C denote the credit rate 
charged and the cost of capital, respectively. While 
we recognize that the adjustment is not instantane-
ous, we assume that the adjustment function is time-
invariant during our sample period and is monoto-
nous in the absolute magnitude of the change in the 
interest rates. Defining 1−−=Δ ttt CCC  and 
1−−=Δ ttt RRR the adjustment could be modeled as: 
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where the superscript on ∆R indicates that it is 
solely the change resulting from the period t change, 
and n is the number of periods it takes for retail 
prices to complete adjustment to the period t 
change1. 
Under these assumptions, the total change in retail 
prices in any period t will depend on the price 
changes in the previous n periods. 
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This equation, however, imposes symmetric re-
sponses in the case of decreases and in the case of 
increases. Recognizing that the processes of in-
creases and decreases can differ in nature is the cru-
cial part of the model. 
Therefore, it is refined to: 
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Defining { }0;max tt CC Δ=Δ + and { }0;min tt CC Δ=Δ − the 
adjustment of retail credit prices may be rewritten 
as: ( ).∑ −+ Δ+Δ=Δ CCR ttt γβ                                               (3) 
This specification adapts model by Borenstein, 
Cameron and Gilbert (1992) to the banking sector. 
The main innovation of this paper is that we distin-
guish among the products offered by the banks. 
Apart from the investment loans, banks also offer 
liquidity credits to firms as well as a variety of 
credit products to consumers (e.g., mortgages, credit 
cards, holiday loans, etc.). Consequently, one might 
ask whether the response patterns are alike among 
the segments of the market and products. To be able 
to account for this, we consider different bank prod-
ucts and attempt to distinguish both the time of the 
response and its magnitude. 
2.1. Empirical specification. A number of econo-
metric issues must be addressed before proceeding 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of clarity we ignore here the systematic drift in the 
interest rates in Poland. However, we do control for it in the 
econometric specification. 
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with estimation of an equation similar to (3)1. Con-
cerning the restrictions imposed on the lag response 
pattern, the additive lag structure allows for non-
monotonicity, thus stipulating little implicit re-
quirements. It also allows for a certain intertemporal 
independence that may be non-standard. For in-
stance, if the interest rate increases by 25 base 
points in month t and decreases by the same amount 
in month t + 1, this model would not necessarily 
cause the direction of adjustment to reverse when 
the interest rate does. The retail price could continue 
to rise in month t + 12. This contrasts with a stan-
dard partial adjustment model and advocates in fa-
vor of additive lag structure. 
The real challenge is to provide a method allowing 
distinguishing between responses to positive and 
negative price shocks. Bacon (1991) tests for 
asymmetry in adjustment rates by including a quad-
ratic term in the adjustment process: 
,)()( 2110211011 −−− −++−+=− tttt RCRCRR φφβφφβ  (4) 
so that the test of 2β = 0 is the test of whether ad-
justments to increases and decreases occur equally 
quickly. However, this approach is essentially 
equivalent to a partial adjustment model, imposing 
equal proportional adjustments towards the new 
equilibrium in all periods after a shock to interest 
rates. Furthermore, Bacon's method for diagnosing 
asymmetry with a quadratic term imposes a struc-
ture on the asymmetry, implying that the asymmetry 
becomes proportionally larger as the difference be-
tween the current retail price and the long-run equi-
librium price increases. On the other hand, the prin-
ciple advantage of the partial adjustment model over 
the lag adjustment model presented above is that 
equation (3) neither takes account of the long-run 
relationship between the prices of the upstream and 
downstream goods, nor incorporates the tendency to 
revert towards that relation. 
To address these problems, we estimate equation (3) 
as an error correction model (ECM). The error cor-
rection term is the one-period lagged residual from 
the regression: 
,210 ttt MOCR φφφ ++=                                                      (5) 
where MOt is a time trend. The monthly regression 
is therefore given by: 
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1 The issues we discuss here arise during the estimation of all 
downstream price transmissions. Extensive literature on pass-through 
mechanisms may serve as a good example. 
2 This would occur if 1−> tt γβ . 
The constant term included accounts for the fact that 
the margins may have systematically changed dur-
ing our sample period, either due to deflation or any 
other factors. Evidently, this specification is not a 
canonic form error correction model due to the 
∑ = −−+− Δ+Δn oi itiiti CC )( γβ decomposition on the right 
hand side. However, the asymptotic properties of 
the estimates are unlikely to be affected by this de-
viation (Verbeek, 2001). The drawback of applying 
this methodology is that the results obtained are 
difficult to interpret in economic terms – it is not 
possible to state by how much is the cost of credit 
inflated as a byproduct of the insufficient competi-
tive pressure. 
The last potential econometric obstacle is the prob-
lem of endogeneity. Does the credit policy of the 
commercial banks influence the decisions of the 
monetary authority? As long as the analysis of the 
central bank official decision criteria is concerned, 
this does not seem to be the case. However, one may 
not exclude this option over the whole sample due 
to the young age of this institutional design. For 
example, excessive consumption and consumption 
credit were identified officially as main reasons for 
increasing interest rates in the second half of 2000 
by the monetary authorities. Thus, endogeneity 
seems to introduce potentially serious problems 
from the technical point of view. At the same time, 
it is a problem without any solution. In this specifi-
cation, using lagged variables as instruments may 
not be considered while no other potential instru-
ments arise. 
Summarizing, equation (5) reflects the long-run 
equilibrium, while the ECM form equation (6) de-
scribes the adjustment dynamics. The constant term 
in this equation informs about the part of the devia-
tion corrected within one period. Further, the error 
correction term suggests whether one can effectively 
talk about a cointegration in this respect, while β's 
and γ's assess the symmetry of the response to the 
change in the underlying fundamentals. 
2.2. Data and results. Data used in this section are 
taken from the Central Bank of Poland and cover 
the time span of December 1996 to April 2007. This 
is a period of gradual inflation rate decreases. De-
spite some temporary economic slowdowns no re-
cession occurred over the entire period. Thus, it 
would be difficult to identify any systemic sources 
of credit risks justifying the reluctancy of banks to 
engage in lending activity. 
In the analysis we employed monthly observations 
on reported credit interest rates for different types 
of loans of differentiated durations (one to three 
and more years). Low frequency data are used for 
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two main reasons. First, some stickiness in the 
rates charged is forced by institutional arrange-
ments1. It seems worth to emphasize that invest-
ment credit rates we used in these models are not 
the official rates put in advertisement leaflets or 
commercials, but effective yields earned on given 
credits. Thus, we observed de facto bank behavior. 
Second, unlike higher frequency data, these time 
series are publicly available, which makes it feasi-
ble to replicate the findings. 
For the same reason, throughout this section the 
modelling relies mainly on aggregate banking sys-
tem data. If some patterns of response to a shock in 
upstream prices prove to be characteristic for sector 
as a whole, results could be interpreted as a general 
tendency within the system. If no statistically sig-
nificant patterns are found either the expected pat-
tern does not exist or banks are so differentiated in 
their individual responses that on average the effect 
cancels out. This study would benefit significantly if 
individual bank data could be used, mainly due to 
the fact that there might persist significant discrep-
ancies in the behavior2. Unfortunately, bank-specific 
data are not accessible for the whole sector. When 
possible, the analysis employs data from 
BANKSCOPE to provide more insights. 
For each of these series we constructed a model as 
described by equation (6). Since this model is based 
by definition on changes and not on levels, seeking 
a proxy for C one can resort to variables that should 
in principle reflect the directions of changes in the 
cost of capital available for lending. These variables 
include: the central bank's interest rate, WIBOR and 
the costs of deposits (i.e., the deposit rate). None of 
these measures should be identified directly with the 
cost of capital to the banks, but they may be consid-
ered as a reasonable indication of changes thereof3. 
All these are taken on annual basis with durations 
adequate to the loans analyzed and corrected for the 
obligatory reserve rates. The conclusions remain 
essentially unaffected by the choice of proxy. The 
results for investment credit are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Short- and long-term investment credit as a dependent variable (LR equilibrium)123 
A: Short-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Monthly trend -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.007* 0.04*** 
CB’s interest rates 0.73***      
Obligatory reserves -0.14*  -0.22  -0.31  
Effective CB’ rates  0.71***     
WIBOR   0.85***    
Effective WIBOR    0.88***   
Deposit rates     1.07***  
Effective deposit rates      1.28*** 
Constant 7.96*** 7.64*** 5.43*** 5.76*** 4.77*** 2.76** 
AIC 227.2 212.6 228.1 211.8 216.9 208.7 
N0 of observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
F-statistics 1529.4 1570.7 1704.4 1822.9 1981.9 1888.9 
B: Long-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Monthly trend -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.03* 0.02** 
CB’s interest rates 0.65***      
Obligatory reserves -0.12*  -0.11  0.08  
Effective CB’ rates  0.66***     
WIBOR   0.77***    
Effective WIBOR    0.79***   
Deposit rates     1.01***  
                                                 
1 Namely, clients need to be notified in advance of how much they are expected to pay in the next installment. 
2 Small banks specializing in some segments of the market follow different monetary and economic signals than large universal banks strategically 
giving preference to one segment of the market over another due to country-wide rentability and foreign headquarters guidelines. Observing 
individual banks effect could help to answer whether such a diagnosis is correct and thus provide more precise and adequate estimates of the 
behavioral patterns. Gambacorta (2004), for example, finds on a sample of Italian banks that the size is never relevant for pricing strategies, while the 
pass-through heterogeneity depends mostly on liability structure. 
3 One could suggest that a direct measure of the cost of capital should be applied. However, little data are available in this respect. Despite some efforts to 
apply Capital Asset Pricing Model to the banking sector (Kochaniak, 2003), analyses are based on relatively low quality data and burdened with the 
limitations following from the assumption about the benchmark. Equity cost or required risk of return (measures obtained so far in the literature) do not 
reflect the cost of mobilizing deposits but the ability of a bank to make produts on its current operations, which is not of interest here. 
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Table 3 (cont.). Short- and long-term investment credit as a dependent variable (LR equilibrium) 
Effective deposit rates      1.19*** 
Constant 11.6*** 9.33*** 5.43*** 5.76*** 4.86*** 2.76** 
AIC 196.2 182.9 196.8 178.4 197.1 181.2 
N0 of observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
F-statistics 1003.5 1485.8 1805.9 1912.9 2185.4 1704.9 
C: Long-term investment credit (bank level data) 
Monthly trend -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02** 
CB’s interest rates 0.61***      
Obligatory reserves -0.10  -0.09  0.05  
Effective CB’ rates  0.72***     
WIBOR   0.78***    
Effective WIBOR    0.84***   
Deposit rates     1.03***  
Effective deposit rates      1.24*** 
Constant 9.33 8.76*** 5.21*** 5.33*** 4.12*** 3.14** 
AIC 111.33 108.3 113.4 107.1 117.2 108.2 
N0 of observations 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 
F-statistics 8763.5 8951.8 8599.9 9112.6 9885.4 9706.2 
Notes: in panels A and B GLS estimation with Newey-West estimates of error terms are presented. All variables are I(1). Residuals are 
found to be I(0). In panel C there are random effects GLS panel estimators with Newey-West estimates of error terms (random effects 
confirmed by Hausman test). All series are found to be I(1), the panel version of ADF test rejected I(1) in residuals. WIBOR durations 
are 12 months for panel A and 3Y for panels B and C. Central bank interest rate refers to a discount rate of a 12-month duration. Deposit 
rate refers to a sector wide deposit rate in all panels, with durations of 12 months for panel A and 3Y for panels B and C. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Data source: Central Bank of Poland (NBP) for panels A and B, and BANKSCOPE for panel C. 
 
Obligatory reserves are mostly insignificant, con-
firming the general observation that compulsory 
reserves are only a minor part of banks actual capi-
tal adequacies measures. In columns (1) and (2) 
central bank's discount interest rate is used as a 
proxy for the capital cost. Columns (3) and (4) dem-
onstrate a similar effect if WIBOR is used as the 
capital cost proxy. As we may observe, the short-
term investment credit rates (1 year) consistently 
decrease in time (negative coefficient by Monthly 
trend variable). However, this is mainly due to gen-
eral lowering of interest rates in time. This is espe-
cially evident in the results in columns (5) and (6), 
where deposit rate proxies the cost of capital to the 
banks. The sign of Monthly trend variable turns 
positive and statistically significant. This may be 
interpreted as a support for the claim of increasing 
spreads, as previously suggested. Furthermore, 
since deposit rates are far below economy observed 
interest rates, coefficients in columns (5) and (6) 
exceed unity. 
Since all variables in this model are non-stationary, 
results of this regression cannot be interpreted in 
terms of causality (although the residuals were 
found to be I(0) for all series, suggesting that they 
cointegrate well). Consequently, an error-correction 
model (ECM) is estimated with residuals of this 
regression as an error correction term. For clarity, 
only results from columns (2), (4) and (6) were 
used, as no significant economic differences be-
tween augmented and straight proxies of capital cost 
may be observed, while the former exhibit better 
statistical properties (lower values of AIC). Results 
are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Short-run dynamics in investment credit 
rates 
A: Short-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 
∆C+ 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.26** 
∆C– -0.03 0.02*** 0.04 
Error correction term 0.22*** 0.54*** 0.69*** 
R2 0.24 0.29 0.38 
N0. of observations 122 122 122 
F-statistics 4.98*** 6.22*** 70.39*** 
B: Long-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Constant -0.07 -0.02 -0.08* 
∆C+ 0.35*** 0.30** 0.31** 
∆C– -0.05 0.05 0.06 
Error correction term 0.17*** 0.32*** 0.65*** 
R2 0.22 0.27 0.38 
N0. of observations 122 122 122 
F-statistics 3.91*** 4.73*** 8.97*** 
C: Long-term investment credit (bank level data) 
Constant -0.11 -0.28 -0.11 
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Table 4 (cont.). Short-run dynamics in investment 
credit rates 
∆C+ 0.31*** 0.34** 0.35** 
∆C– -0.11 0.15 0.08 
Error correction term 0.22*** 0.45*** 0.74*** 
R2 within 0.21 0.27 0.31 
R2 between 0.44 0.47 0.48 
N0. of observations 1612 1612 1612 
F-statistics 41.9*** 48.3*** 55.7*** 
Notes: in panels A and B GLS estimation with Newey-West esti-
mates of error terms are presented. All variables are I(0). Panel C 
presents random effects GLS panel estimators with Newey-West 
estimates of error terms (confirmed by Hausman test). 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Data source: Central Bank of Poland (NBP) for panels A and B 
and BANKSCOPE for panel C. BANKSCOPE data should not 
be considered representative for the whole sector – in the case 
of Poland some important banks were not included over some 
periods of time. 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) present results for central 
bank's interest rate, WIBOR and deposit rates, re-
spectively. Constant insignificance suggests that the 
adjustment process is far from rapid, with virtually 
no change within the first month after departure 
from the long-run trends. This should be interpreted 
as a very slow equilibrium reversion pattern. Error 
correction term is statistically significant, while its 
positive sign suggests persistence above the long-
term equilibrium. 
The short-term investment credit interest rates seem 
to react in no way to interest rate decreases (∆C–  
coefficient is insignificant) in the short run, while an 
immediate reaction to increases in interest rates is 
strongly confirmed. Since ∆C+ variables take the 
value of change in interest rates when it is positive 
and zero otherwise, investment credit becomes im-
mediately more expensive when market conditions 
deteriorate. On the other hand, improvement in the 
market conditions seems to have no impact in the 
short run1. This observation is consistent with the 
asymmetric response hypothesis. 
So far the results demonstrate that banks do not 
respond – or only marginally respond – to decreases 
in the economy-wide interest rates when setting 
investment credit rates. Identical models for con-
sumer credit rates were estimated. The results are 
presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5. Short- and long-term consumer credit as a dependent variable (LR equilibrium)1 
A: Short-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Monthly trend -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.01* 0.04*** 
CB’s interest rates 035***      
Obligatory reserves -0.14*  -0.12  -0.19  
Effective CB’ rates  0.47***     
WIBOR   0.91***    
Effective WIBOR    0.94***   
Deposit rates     1.22***  
Effective deposit rates      1.29*** 
Constant 15.22*** 14.94*** 15.87*** 16.69*** 24.18*** 27.87** 
AIC 255.1 212.6 262.6 201.5 246.7 203.2 
N0 of observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
F-statistics 1619.4 1750.5 1788.4 1825.3 1984.5 1888.9 
B: Long-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Monthly trend -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.11*** 0.03* 0.06** 
CB’s interest rates 0.44***      
Obligatory reserves -0.11*  -0.10  0.07  
Effective CB’ rates  0.56***     
WIBOR   0.68***    
Effective WIBOR    0.77***   
Deposit rates     1.11***  
Effective deposit rates      1.31*** 
                                                 
1 One could suggest that a direct measure of the cost of capital should be applied. However, little data are available in this respect. Despite some 
efforts to apply Capital Asset Pricing Model to the banking sector (Kochaniak, 2003), analyses are based on relatively low quality data and 
burdened with the limitations following from the assumption about the benchmark. Equity cost or required risk of return (measures obtained so 
far in the literature) do not reflect the cost of mobilizing deposits but the ability of a bank to make produts on its current operations, which is not 
of interest here.  
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Table 5 (cont.). Short- and long-term consumer credit as a dependent variable (LR equilibrium) 
Constant 12.8*** 19.5*** 25.4*** 25.8*** 34.6*** 37.6** 
AIC 187.6 163.9 189.8 172.1 187.1 171.4 
N0 of observations 124 124 124 124 124 124 
F-statistics 1111.3 1238.2 1408.5 1519.2 1806.4 1854.7 
C: Long-term investment credit (bank level data) 
Monthly trend -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 0.01*** 0.02** 
CB’s interest rates 0.62***      
Obligatory reserves -0.10  -0.43  0.06  
Effective CB’ rates  0.78***     
WIBOR   0.85***    
Effective WIBOR    0.96***   
Deposit rates     1.23***  
Effective deposit rates      1.44*** 
Constant 16.3*** 18.5*** 25.5*** 28.5*** 29.1*** 33.4** 
AIC 154.1 143.3 152.4 137.6 149.2 138.2 
N0 of observations 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 1736 
F-statistics 8555.5 8992.5 8609.4 8805.6 8886.5 8733.6 
Notes: in panels A and B GLS estimation with Newey-West estimates of error terms are presented. All variables are I(1). Residuals 
are found to be I(0). Panel C presents random effects GLS panel estimators with Newey-West estimates of error terms (random 
effects confirmed by Hausman test). All series found I(1), the panel version of ADF test rejected I(1) in residuals. 
WIBOR durations are 12 months for panel A and 3Y for panels B and C. Central bank interest rate refers to a discount rate of a 12-
month duration. Deposit rate refers to a sector wide deposit rate in all panels, with deposit durations of 12 months for panel A and 
3Y for panels B and C. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Data source: Central Bank of Poland (NBP) for panels A and B and BANKSCOPE for panel C. 
 
Obviously, the consumer credit rates are higher than 
those observed throughout the banking sector for the 
investment financing (constant estimators are con-
sistently higher than for investment credit data, 
while these differences are statistically significant). 
This reflects the differences in the risk associated 
with these two segments, suggesting that banks are 
able to adequately evaluate and assess the risk. 
Conversely, the estimators of monthly trend in col-
umns (1)-(4) are significantly higher and in columns 
(5) and (6) are significantly lower for consumer 
credit than for the investment credit. This seems to 
suggest that more rapid reactions to changes occur 
in the consumer credit rates while spreads grew 
slower in this segment of the market. To estimate 
ECM as in the case of investment credit, the residu-
als from columns (2), (4) and (6) were considered 
(AIC values again proved lowest pairwise). Results 
are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. Short-run dynamics in consumer credit 
rates 
A: Short-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 
∆C+ 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.28** 
∆C– 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.24*** 
Error correction term 0.22*** 0.45*** 0.59*** 
R2 0.11 0.16 0.327 
N0. of observations 122 122 122 
F-statistics 4.85*** 5.47*** 8.12*** 
B: Long-term investment credit (sectoral data) 
Constant 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 
∆C+ 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 
∆C– 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 
Error correction term 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
R2 0.16 0.17 0.18 
N0. of observations 122 122 122 
F-statistics 5.19*** 6.54*** 7.98*** 
C: Long-term investment credit (bank level data) 
Constant 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
∆C+ 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 
∆C– 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
Error correction term 0.27*** 0.48*** 0.55*** 
R2 between 0.57 0.62 0.68 
R2 within 0.27 0.33 0.34 
N0. of observations 1612 1612 1612 
F-statistics 84.5*** 92.8*** 95.1*** 
Notes: in panels A and B GLS estimation with Newey-West 
estimates of error terms. All variables are I(0). In panel C 
random effects GLS panel estimators with Newey-West 
estimates of error terms (confirmed by Hausman test). 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Data source: Central Bank of Poland (NBP) for panels A and B 
and BANKSCOPE for panel C. 
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For consumer credits, constant is positive and sig-
nificant – reversion to equilibrium occurs within six 
to seven months (the rate of approximately 15% per 
month). Both decreases and increases in economy 
interest rates have significant impact on the rates 
charged from the clients. This suggests that the con-
sumer credit segment is far more responsive to the 
changes in capital cost. Comparing ∆C+ and ∆C– 
coefficients reveals that asymmetry occurs even 
within this segment of the market – banks respond 
more to increases than to decreases in underlying 
fundamentals. 
Comparing results for consumer and investment 
credit rates, the former seem to be far more respon-
sive, while the latter exhibit no equilibrium rever-
sion pattern and no reaction to the decreases in the 
proxies of capital cost. This may be interpreted as a 
suggestion of implicit discrimination of entrepre-
neurs. For strategic reasons, banks seem to imple-
ment some form of rationing the capital to the firms 
– some explanation for this phenomenon may be 
provided by the lazy-banking hypothesis (Banerjee 
and Dufflo, 2004)1, consistent with the behavioral 
parallelism claim. 
2.3. Credit-deposit nexus. If a bank fails to main-
tain a close link between deposits and the allocated 
credits, with the efficient interbanking market, it 
would immediately induce the reverse disequilib-
rium in another bank (or many other banks par-
tially). However, any bank can only afford the dis-
crepancy between the volumes of credits and depos-
its knowing that either its structure is being mim-
icked by others or no other bank will pose it a threat 
on the 'short' position. Lack of links between the 
volumes of credits and deposits – especially on the 
aggregate level of the entire sector – may thus be 
interpreted in terms of insufficient competition. 
This reasoning is developed based on Monti-Klein 
model of a monopolistic bank2, which finds that if 
interest rates increase, both credit rates and deposit 
rates may increase3. In particular, deposit and credit 
rates are not directly interlinked4. Recall that Polish 
banks were found to respond differently to de-
                                                 
1 One could also suggest that the consumer credit segment is probably 
also more profitable, as screening in the case of credit cards or a debit 
line on private accounts happens automatically as a function of the 
historical record of a client. Thus, it neither requires case-by-case due 
diligence, nor understanding of the business outlooks in differentiated 
sectors of economy as well as analyzing historical balance sheets. 
2 More specifically, a bank is confronted with an upward sloping upply 
of deposit curve and downward sloping demand for loans curve. The 
main assumption of this model is that bank decides about quantities of 
deposits accepted and loans granted, rather than the prices of both. This 
assumption appears reasonable especially in the case of credits, as these 
are accorded on case by case basis and not by a general rule of interest 
rate. It is further necessary to assume that the cost of capital (r) is 
external to bank (either set by a central bank or determined on 
international capital markets, i.e. bank is a price-taker of inputs). 
3 See Freixas and Rochet (2002), p. 59 for a proof. 
4 See Freixas and Rochet (2002), p. 47 for a proof. 
creases and increases in the interest rates. Although 
counterintuitive, this result is fully explainable on 
the grounds of Monti-Klein model of monopolistic 
bank5. In general, prediction of this model can be 
summarized as follows: deposit and loan volumes 
should cointegrate in time. This conclusion provides 
theoretical grounds for the empirical analysis. 
We use monthly data for 1996-2005 on a panel of 
Polish banks. The data were taken from Central 
Bank of Poland. Model under scrutiny is best de-
scribed by: 
ttt DepositsCredits εβα +Δ+=Δ , 
where tε  is the error term. First differences were 
used instead of levels, as original time series were 
found to be non-stationary. 
The hypothesis of monopolistic market structure 
sector implies that one should expect β = 0 as a null 
hypothesis. Rejecting it is equivalent to stating that 
credits granted and deposits accepted are related to 
each other, thus suggesting a competitive environ-
ment. Should we find β  close to unity, we could 
claim that market outcome is close to perfectly 
competitive one. Results are presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Changes in loans as function of deposits in 
Polish banking sector 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Constant 803.87** 801.23** 
∆Deposits 0.45*** 0.48*** 
R2 0.32 0.31 (between) 
N0. of observations 100 587 
F-statistics 12.13*** 45.82*** 
Notes: cointegration of first order differences of deposits and 
loans, robust standard errors. All variables are I(0) stationary. 
Neither autocorrelation, nor heteroscedasticity found in the 
cross-sectoral sample, while errors in panel data were robustly 
estimated. Residuals are determined to be I(0). 
In panel regression, bank ID is used as a grouping variable. 
Random effect results (confirmed by Hausmann test). 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Data source: Central Bank of Poland (NBP). 
Column (1) describes results on aggregate data and 
column (2) reports panel data results. Estimates are 
not statistically significantly different across speci-
fications. Both regressions have satisfying statistical 
properties. Estimates by ∆Deposits variable are 
                                                 
5 However, Elyasiani et al. (1995) demonstrate on a sample of American 
banks that the portfolio separation feature does not accurately 
characterize bank. Namely, they find that in the presence of 
simultaneous adjustment costs the banking system loan demand and 
deposit supply responses to changes in monetary policy are likely to be 
both lagged and intertwined, resulting in complicated adjustment paths 
for both the deposit and loan rates. Furthermore, these costs may also 
influence the optimal size of banking firms and thus the competitive 
make-up of different banking markets. 
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positive and seem to be highly statistically signifi-
cant, thus dismissing the suggestion of uncompeti-
tive market structure. However, graphical represen-
tation of these results seems to corroborate rather 
than undermine the findings of the first model dis-
cussed earlier in the paper. 
 
Source: own calculations. 
Fig. 3. Relation between deposits and loans 
Figure 3 shows that a positive slope of the fitted line 
(with the angle of approximately 45 degrees) fol-
lows solely from a small number of outlying obser-
vations. Other than that, the cloud of observations 
indicates no particular slope, suggesting no cointe-
gration of the series1. The extreme negative values 
of loans and deposits are very difficult to explain in 
a stable economy – such drastic decreases in vol-
umes of loans and credits are characteristic to credit 
crunches or currency crises, none of which occurred 
in Poland in recent years. The very high positive 
values suggest credit booms associated with deposit 
booms in the same period – in this study the period 
is as short as one month (!) – which occur contem-
poraneously rather seldom in any type of economy. 
Summarizing, the application of Monti-Klein model 
to Polish data has confirmed the initial finding of 
some form of uniform behavior in the Polish bank-
ing sector. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed a potentially vital 
problem of the Polish economy. We leave aside the 
question of bank operating profitability as well as 
sector stability. Instead, we focus on the extent to 
which banks may play the role of capital provider to 
the entrepreneurs (investment credit). In particular 
we analyze the question of availability of credit with 
considerable attention devoted to possible discrimi-
nation between consumers and entrepreneurs. The 
privatized sector of commercial banks may actually 
be one of the inhibitors of faster economic growth. 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, most outliers' tests are not feasible in the case of panel 
analysis, while identifying them on aggregate data has little 
applications. 
We compare the investment and the consumption 
credit finding that banks (as firms themselves) have 
certain preferences among the borrowers, effectively 
rationing one group at the expense of the other. 
We first analyzed whether the responses of banks to 
changes in the cost of capital (as proxied by differ-
entiated indicators) are symmetric. We observed that 
in the short run banks essentially do not respond in 
their investment loans rates to decreases in interest 
rates. Moreover, this process has no ergodic proper-
ties (no mean reversion). We have also analyzed the 
behavior of the consumer loans rates, finding that for 
the latter market segment this stochastic process re-
verts to a long-run equilibrium (within some six to 
seven months after an initial shock) while the asym-
metry is definitely less intense than in the case of 
entrepreneurial offers. 
This study has some limitations following from the 
nature of problem addressed or data available. Two of 
these limitations seem to challenge the results mostly. 
First of all, Kishan and Opiela (2002) argue that 
with differentiated population of banks the individ-
ual effects may cancel out, turning the aggregate 
estimates insignificant, thus advocating in favor of 
using bank-specific data. Whenever possible, this 
recommendation was implemented. Nonetheless, 
more micro-level analysis seems necessary in order 
to disentangle bank-specific effects from the sec-
toral trends. Elyasiani et al. (1995) and Gambacorta 
(2003) demonstrate that the adjustment costs may 
simultaneously influence bank deposit and loan 
choices, while interest rates with different durations 
may respond differently across banks depending on 
the liquidity and capitalization of the banks as well 
as the duration and convexity of their credit portfo-
lio. All these dimensions could not be explored in 
this study for the reasons of data availability. The 
fact that random effects are confirmed in all panel 
estimations may indicate that heterogeneity may be 
large indeed. On the other hand, within R2 esti-
mates are fairly high, suggesting that a group of 
market leaders seems to conform to a uniform pric-
ing strategy. 
Secondly, in the paper these findings are attributed 
to a Banerjee and Dufflo (2004) “lazy banking” 
basing on discrimination policies hypothesis consis-
tent with behavioral parallelism claim. One could 
argue, however, that inflexibility of corporate credit 
when compared to consumer credit should be ana-
lyzed in the context of the adverse selection problem 
assessed as pervasive in the case of Poland. The cost 
of capital differs across banking products and is 
considerably higher for investment credits where 
screening involves considerably more effort than in 
the case of consumer credits. Nonetheless, since by 
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definition banks are institutions specialized in deal-
ing with this sort of diligence, we consider them to 
be equipped in know-how and tools to solve prob-
lems of asymmetric information and moral hazard 
(Van Cayselee, 2001). Thus, in an efficient institu-
tional design competitive pressure would result in 
developing dedicated tools for evaluation in all 
segments of the market. Qualitative analyses (Akiba 
and Lisowska, 2006) suggest that this is not the case 
and some segments of borrowers are consistently 
forgone by the banking sector. 
What typically guarantees that entrepreneurs are not 
forced to compete for capital with consumers is 
bank specialization. However, in a system populated 
mostly by universal financial intermediaries, with 
even mortgage services provided by retail banks, 
there is little economic rationale for setting up spe-
cialized institutions in the discriminated and more 
demanding segments of the market. Therefore, it 
seems that without an external incentive scheme this 
outcome is likely to continue. 
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